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 NOTE 
Picking Winners and Losers: The 
Subjectivity of Missouri Disciplinary 
Decisions 
In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) 
Bradley Craigmyle* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine someone close to you unexpectedly impregnates his girlfriend.  
He wants to raise the child and does not want to put the baby up for adoption, 
but the mother feels adoption is best.  To facilitate the adoption process, the 
mother hires a lawyer.  This lawyer intentionally keeps the father and the fa-
ther’s attorney in the dark regarding the adoption proceedings.  The mother 
then, under her lawyer’s guidance, gives false testimony at a court hearing so 
the child can be adopted.  The father – who had been misled about the baby’s 
due date and deprived of custody for over one year – eventually learns of the 
child’s birth and intervenes in the adoption proceedings.  Imagine further that 
the lawyer who orchestrated the plan to deceive the father and separate him 
from his child never loses his law license.  Would you feel satisfied with this 
outcome?  Would this strike you as the appropriate discipline?  Or would you 
expect justice to take another form?  While this might seem like a far-fetched 
hypothetical, it was a harsh reality for at least one Missourian not long ago. 
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) provides a guide for state-level 
ethics laws known as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model 
Rules”).  The Supreme Court of Missouri adopts ethics laws (“Missouri 
Rules”) and disciplines lawyers who violate these laws.1  One of a lawyer’s 
 
* B.A., Truman State University, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2017; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  I owe many thanks 
to the Missouri Law Review editing and footnote folks for their hard work and thought-
ful feedback.  All remaining errors are mine alone. 
 1. The Missouri Rules are the substantive equivalent of the Model Rules.  See 
MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-8.5(a) (“A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject 
to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction regardless of where the lawyer’s con-
duct occurs.  A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary 
authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal ser-
vices in this jurisdiction.  A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both 
this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions for the same conduct.”). 
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most fundamental duties is exercising honesty toward the tribunal, and the Mis-
souri Rules prohibit a lawyer from engaging in dishonest behavior before tri-
bunals.2 
This Note traces the facts and holding of the case In re Krigel, before 
delving into the ABA’s influential role in legal ethics.  Next, it outlines Mis-
souri’s attorney discipline procedures and analyzes pertinent Missouri case 
law.  Lastly, this Note critiques the majority opinion and argues that Krigel 
should have been disbarred. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In response to several alleged violations of the Missouri Rules, the Office 
of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel (“OCDC”) adopted the Disciplinary Hearing 
Panel’s (“DHP”) recommendation and sought suspension of Sanford P. Kri-
gel’s law license.3  Krigel objected to the DHP’s recommendation and asked 
the Supreme Court of Missouri to dismiss the OCDC’s Information (Missouri’s 
charging document).4 
Krigel became a member of The Missouri Bar in 1976.5  In 1978, he began 
practicing law with his wife, and their firm employs eleven attorneys.6  He 
specializes in adoption law and, before this incident, had no record of discipli-
nary action.7  The conduct at issue stemmed from Krigel’s representation of an 
“unmarried, pregnant, eighteen year old woman” (“Birth Mother”) in 2009.8  
Initially, Birth Mother and Birth Father agreed to hide the unexpected preg-
nancy from their parents until Birth Mother was eight months pregnant.9  Dur-
ing their meeting with both parents to discuss the pregnancy, Birth Father as-
serted that he wanted to raise the child and did not want to give it up for adop-
tion.10  The birth parents’ relationship deteriorated because of this meeting, and 
Birth Mother’s parents tried to prevent Birth Father from contacting Birth 
Mother.11 
Birth Father hired attorney Jeff Zimmerman to assist him with Birth 
Mother’s pregnancy.12  Concurrently, Birth Mother asked Hillary Merryfield, 
 
 2. Id. R. 4-3.3(a) (prohibiting lawyers from knowingly presenting “a false state-
ment of fact or law to a tribunal”). 
 3. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 298–99 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 4. Id. at 299. 
 5. Id. at 296. 
 6. Sanford P. Krigel, KRIGEL & KRIGEL L. OFFS., https://www.krigelandkri-
gel.com/people/sanford-p-krigel/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2017); Our People: Attorneys, 
KRIGEL & KRIGEL L. OFFS., https://www.krigelandkrigel.com/section/attorney/ (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
 7. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 296–97. 
 8. Id. at 297. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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who runs a child placement agency, for an attorney referral.13  Merryfield and 
Krigel had worked together on adoptions for around twenty years, and she rec-
ommended Krigel to Birth Mother.14  Krigel met with Birth Mother on March 
11, 2010, and Birth Mother explained that she felt it would be best to give the 
child up for adoption.15  She also informed Krigel that Birth Father would not 
consent to an adoption.16  Birth Mother retained Krigel to counsel her in termi-
nating her parental rights in preparation for an adoption.17  Krigel implemented 
a “passive strategy,” whereby they “would actively do nothing to communicate 
with Birth Father or his counsel; they would not advise Birth Father or his 
counsel of the adoption plans, the birth of the child, and the instigation of any 
legal proceedings.”18 
On March 19, 2010, Zimmerman called Krigel and suggested that the 
birth parents receive counseling outside their parents’ presence.19  Already 
knowing Birth Mother was working with Merryfield seeking an adoption, Kri-
gel proposed the birth parents meet with Merryfield.20  During this call, Krigel 
told Zimmerman the child would not be adopted without the Birth Father’s 
consent.21  After meeting with the birth parents, Merryfield reported to Krigel 
that Birth Father did not want to consent to an adoption, but she believed that 
Birth Father would not contest the adoption because she felt he was “quiet, sad, 
and passive.”22 
Birth Mother contacted Birth Father in late March – intending to deceive 
him – and falsely claimed that her due date had changed from early April to 
early May.23  The child was born, and neither Birth Father nor Zimmerman was 
informed.24  Next, Birth Mother attended a hearing in Jackson County, Mis-
souri, to terminate her parental rights and move forward with the adoption on 
April 6, 2010.25  Both Birth Father and Zimmerman failed to attend because 
neither was aware of the hearing.26  Responding to Krigel’s question at the 
hearing, Birth Mother agreed that “Birth Father had been consulted at length 
about the matter.”27  Krigel also asked Birth Mother: “[E]ven though you’ve 
talked to him and his family at some length, he has not stepped forward since 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 297–98 (internal quotations omitted). 
 19. Id. at 298. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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the birth of the child claiming any rights to the child”; and she agreed.28  The 
court terminated Birth Mother’s parental rights and transferred custody to the 
prospective adoptive parents.29  Birth Father intervened in the adoption pro-
ceedings after learning of the child’s birth, and the trial court awarded legal 
and physical custody to Birth Father on May 6, 2011.30 
The OCDC filed an Information against Krigel in 2014, and the DHP 
(discussed below) conducted an evidentiary hearing – it recommended sus-
pending Krigel indefinitely, without leave to apply for reinstatement, for six 
months.31  The OCDC (Missouri’s investigative disciplinary body) accepted 
the recommendation, but Krigel did not – believing no sanctions should be im-
posed – and appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri.32  The Supreme Court 
of Missouri found that Krigel violated the Missouri Rules, specifically Rules 
4-3.3(a)(3) (knowingly offering false evidence), 4-4.1(a) (making a false state-
ment of material fact), 4-4.4(a) (improperly burdening or delaying a third per-
son), and 4-8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice).33  The court stayed Krigel’s suspension, subject to his completion of two 
years’ probation, according to court-imposed conditions.34 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Lawyers, as professionals, must exercise a high degree of skill and care, 
and ethical behavior is part of that skill and care.35  This Part looks at the ABA’s 
function in articulating and enforcing legal ethics.  Next, it analyzes Missouri’s 
legal ethics laws and synthesizes Missouri case law that deals with Rule 4-
3.3(a) violations, which involve lawyers who knowingly present false evi-
dence.  The court cited all of the cases discussed below in deciding Krigel’s 
fate. 
 
 28. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 298–99. 
 32. Id. at 299. 
 33. Id. at 296. 
 34. Id. 
 35. LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE 
OF LAW 5 (4th ed. 2016). 
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A.  The ABA’s Role in Legal Ethics 
One of the ABA’s goals is to improve the legal profession.36  A related 
objective is to “[p]romote competence, ethical conduct[,] and professional-
ism.”37  Against this backdrop, the ABA has helped develop the ethical frame-
work governing lawyer behavior for over a century.38  In an effort to proac-
tively encourage lawyers to act ethically, the ABA, in 1908, promulgated the 
Canons of Professional Ethics (“Canons”).39  In 1969, the ABA replaced the 
Canons with suggested disciplinary rules when it adopted the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility (“Model Code”).40  The ABA approved the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) in 1983 to address some im-
portant problems lawyers were facing that the Model Code did not adequately 
address.41  The ABA continues to revise and publish the Model Rules, and 
while they are not law, the Model Rules have been very influential in most 
states.42 
Lawyer discipline is meant to serve three main functions.  It aims to pro-
tect the public, ensure the administration of justice, and maintain the integrity 
of the profession.43  The ABA promulgated the Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions (“Standards”) to increase disciplinary consistency in 1986.44  The 
Standards instruct courts to consider the following when disciplining a lawyer: 
(1) the duty violated, (2) the lawyer’s mental state, (3) the actual or potential 
injury the lawyer’s misconduct caused, and (4) any aggravating or mitigating 
factors.45  Aggravating factors relevant to Krigel’s case include: (1) multiple 
offenses, (2) a refusal to acknowledge the conduct’s wrongful nature, and (3) 
substantial experience practicing law.46  The only mitigating factor mentioned 
in Krigel’s case was the absence of a prior disciplinary record.47 
Model Rule 3.3(a) seeks to ensure candor toward the tribunal; it instructs 
that a “lawyer shall not knowingly . . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to 
be false.”48  Further, a lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures if he, 
his client, or his witness offers material evidence and the lawyer later learns 
 
 36. ABA Mission and Goals, ABA, http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/about_the_aba/aba-mission-goals.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
 37. Id. 
 38. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 35, at 36. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 37. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 21. 
 43. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Preface (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1986). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 3.0. 
 46. Id. at 9.22. 
 47. Id. at 9.32. 
 48. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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the evidence is false.49  If necessary, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal about 
the false evidence.50  Under the Standards, generally, a lawyer should be dis-
barred if he intends to deceive the court in making a false statement or with-
holding material information and injures a party or adversely affects the legal 
proceeding.51  For less serious violations, a lawyer should generally be sus-
pended if he knows false statements are being submitted to the court, fails to 
take remedial action, and a party is injured or the legal proceeding is adversely 
affected.52 
Model Rule 4.1 concerns truthfulness in statements to others, and it for-
bids a lawyer from knowingly making “a false statement of material fact or law 
to a third person” in the course of representing a client.53  To comply with 
Model Rule 4.4(a), a lawyer must not engage in behavior that has no substantial 
purpose “other than to embarrass, delay, or burden” another person.54  Lastly, 
a lawyer violates Model Rule 8.4(d) – and commits professional misconduct – 
if he engages in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.55 
B.  Missouri Ethics Laws and Disciplinary Procedures 
The Supreme Court of Missouri oversees the state’s lawyer disciplinary 
system.56  The Missouri Rules govern The Missouri Bar, and Rules 4-3.3(a)(3), 
4-4.1(a), 4-4.4(a), and 4-8.4(d) are functionally identical to the Model Rules 
discussed above.57 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 6.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1986) 
(emphasis added). 
 52. Id. at 6.12.  Further, 
 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in 
determining whether statements or documents are false or in taking reme-
dial action when material information is being withheld, and causes injury 
or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse 
or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding. 
 
Id. at 6.13. 
 53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(a). 
 54. Id. r. 4.4(a). 
 55. Id. r. 8.4(d).  This rule has been described as “a kind of catch-all that exhorts 
people to act honorable, without defining the behavior that could cause a lawyer to be 
disciplined or even disbarred”; it applies to a “wide range of conduct.”  LERMAN & 
SCHRAG, supra note 35, at 739. 
 56. Disciplinary Information, MO. BAR, http://www.mobar.org/ethics/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 28, 2017). 
 57. Comparison of Newly Adopted Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct with 
ABA Model Rules, ABA (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/miss.authcheckdam.pdf.  The Missouri Rules number-
ing scheme follows closely the Model Rules, but because the Missouri Rules are part 
6
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When a person believes a lawyer has acted unethically, she may file a 
complaint with the OCDC, an office the Supreme Court of Missouri created to 
investigate ethical complaints filed against lawyers.58  First, the OCDC screens 
the complaint to ensure it deals with professional misconduct.59  Next, if the 
complaint does involve professional misconduct, the OCDC may either refer 
the complainant to the Complaint Resolution Program60 or “open” the com-
plaint file.61  The OCDC or a Regional Disciplinary Committee (“RDC”) (local 
committees comprised of lawyers and non-lawyers) investigates the opened 
complaint.62  The investigation may include written investigation, telephone 
calls, and personal interviews.63  Based on the investigation, the Chief Disci-
plinary Counsel (“CDC”) or RDC: (1) closes the file, (2) issues a written ad-
monition, or (3) files an Information.64  The investigative body closes the file 
if it finds no violation.65  If the investigative body believes the lawyer has com-
mitted a minor violation, it can issue a written admonition that becomes part of 
the lawyer’s record.66  The investigative body will file an Information if it de-
cides the lawyer committed a serious violation.67  The lawyer may request a 
hearing on the Information within thirty days; otherwise, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri imposes discipline by default.68 
If the offending lawyer requests a hearing, the Advisory Committee (com-
posed of lawyers and non-lawyers appointed by the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri) assigns the case to a DHP (which includes two lawyers and one non-
lawyer chosen from a larger panel appointed by the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri).69  The DHP hears evidence and recommends one of the following: (1) 
dismissal, (2) written admonition, (3) reprimand, or (4) suspension or disbar-
ment.70  Either party may appeal the DHP’s recommendation to the Supreme 
 
of Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4, Model Rule 1.0 is Supreme Court Rule 4-1.0 in 
Missouri, and so on.  See MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.0. 
 58. Disciplinary Information, supra note 56. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (“In some instances it is appropriate to refer the complainant to the Com-
plaint Resolution Program administered by The Missouri Bar or a fee dispute resolution 
program.  Local bar associations in St. Louis and Kansas City operate fee dispute res-
olution programs serving those areas, while The Missouri Bar administers such a pro-
gram for the rest of the state.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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Court of Missouri.71  The parties may then brief and argue the issue before the 
court makes a decision.72 
The OCDC data from 2015 show: eighteen disbarments, twenty-seven 
suspensions (eleven of which were stayed), four public reprimands, and eighty-
three written admonitions.73  Only nine cases were appealed and briefed to the 
Supreme Court of Missouri, and of those nine, only five were heard because 
the offending attorney disagreed with a DHP’s recommended sanction.74 
C.  Missouri Precedent 
Sketching Missouri precedent is meant to serve two functions.  First, do-
ing so provides background on the cases the court cited – and presumably found 
instructive – in deciding Krigel’s case.  Second, due to the number of cases 
discussed, it allows us to better understand the method with which the Supreme 
Court of Missouri analyzes and decides disciplinary cases. 
In the 1992 case In re Ver Dught, Ver Dught represented a client in her 
appeal to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to receive Supplemental Se-
curity Income and Disabled Widow’s benefits.75  Ver Dught’s client remarried 
before the ALJ hearing, and he advised the client not to reveal her married 
name when testifying; Ver Dught then elicited false testimony.76  Ver Dught 
referred to his client by her maiden name three times, despite being fully aware 
that she had taken her new husband’s last name.77  Ver Dught also stated that 
his client had only been married twice, even though Ver Dught knew his client 
was currently married to her third husband.78  The Supreme Court of Missouri 
found that Ver Dught: (1) knowingly made a false statement of material fact to 
the tribunal, (2) failed to disclose to the tribunal a material fact when disclosure 
was necessary to avoid assisting his client in a criminal or fraudulent act, (3) 
offered evidence he knew was false, (4) engaged in conduct involving dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and (5) engaged in conduct prejudicial 
to the administration of justice.79 
Despite these missteps, the court distinguished Ver Dught’s actions from 
those of a lawyer who is “demonstrably unfit to continue in the profession” and 
did not disbar him.80  The court distinguished based on mitigating evidence that 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, REPORT TOGETHER WITH THE 
FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE TREASURER OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE FUND FOR 2015, 
at 22 (May 2016), http://www.mochiefcounsel.org/articles/Annual%20Re-
port%202015.pdf. 
 74. Id. 
 75. In re Ver Dught, 825 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). 
 76. Id. at 849–50. 
 77. Id. at 848–49. 
 78. Id. at 850. 
 79. Id. at 850–51. 
 80. Id. 
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he contributed to his profession, community, and church, and that he possessed 
a “good” reputation in the community.81  The court concluded Ver Dught’s 
conduct did not warrant disbarment and instead suspended him for six 
months.82 
In 1994, the defendant in the case In re Oberhellmann was charged with 
violating the Missouri Rules; the violations stemmed from his conduct in two 
separate matters.83  In the first matter, Oberhellmann alleged that his client re-
sided in Texas to establish diversity jurisdiction, but Oberhellmann knew his 
client lived in Missouri.84  When answering interrogatories, Oberhellmann 
used his mother’s Illinois address as his client’s.85  The client then followed 
Oberhellmann’s instructions and lied at her deposition to corroborate the inter-
rogatories; she claimed she lived with Dorothy Goode and claimed that Goode 
was her cousin.86  Oberhellmann also told his client to avoid answering a ques-
tion during her deposition if he tapped her foot or knee.87  The Supreme Court 
of Missouri held Oberhellmann violated the Missouri Rules by: (1) knowingly 
making a false statement of material fact, (2) counseling his client to give false 
testimony, and (3) engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice.88 
In the second matter, Oberhellmann forged his former law partner’s sig-
nature on a motion to withdraw.89  The court found that he violated the Mis-
souri Rules by: (1) knowingly making a false statement of material fact, (2) 
engaging in conduct involving dishonestly, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, 
and (3) engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.90  The 
court mentioned no mitigating factors and looked to the Standards and prece-
dent in disbarring Oberhellmann because he knowingly made a false statement 
and submitted a false document with the intent to deceive the court.91 
In another 1994 case, In re Storment, the offending attorney counseled his 
witness to testify falsely and asked questions on direct examination designed 
to elicit the false testimony.92  After the witness gave surprising, and potentially 
damaging, testimony, Storment requested a recess.93  The court reporter inad-
vertently left the tape recorder on, and it captured Storment telling the witness 
to deny the damaging testimony.94  Storment further told the witness, “If you  
 81. Id. at 851. 
 82. Id. 
 83. In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Mo. 1994) (en banc). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 854. 
 89. Id. at 855. 
 90. Id. at 855–56. 
 91. Id. at 856. 
 92. In re Storment, 873 S.W.2d 227, 229–30 (Mo. 1994) (en banc). 
 93. Id. at 228. 
 94. Id. 
9
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said it didn’t happen, it didn’t happen.”95  The Supreme Court of Missouri 
found that Storment: (1) knowingly failed to disclose a material fact necessary 
to avoid assisting a client’s fraudulent act, (2) offered evidence he knew to be 
false, (3) engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre-
sentation, and (4) engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice.96  The court disbarred him based on the Standards; the court mentioned 
no mitigating factors.97 
In the 1997 case In re Caranchini, Caranchini was charged with engaging 
in unethical behavior based on her conduct in four cases.98  In the first case, 
Caranchini’s unethical behavior resulted largely from a lack of diligence; she 
failed to properly investigate her client’s claim before filing the complaint, and 
the district court dismissed her client’s case on summary judgment.99  The Su-
preme Court of Missouri found that she violated four Missouri Rules: (1) bring-
ing a frivolous claim, (2) failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite litiga-
tion, (3) violating or attempting to violate the Missouri Rules, and (4) engaging 
in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.100 
In the second case, Caranchini tried using a forged document to support 
her client’s claim and continued using it after she learned of its forgery.101  The 
court concluded she: (1) pursued a frivolous claim, (2) failed to make reasona-
ble efforts to expedite litigation, (3) knowingly offered evidence she knew to 
be false, (4) engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep-
resentation, and (5) engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice.102 
Caranchini in the third case made unsupported allegations, offered affirm-
ative misrepresentations, and withheld material evidence.103  Specifically, 
Caranchini affirmatively misrepresented the date she learned that a potential 
party’s residence had changed, and she intentionally failed to disclose a signif-
icant witness’s name, hoping to surprise the opposition at trial.104  She also 
purposely misrepresented her ability to connect several witnesses to her client, 
after the court instructed Caranchini that the witnesses could only testify if they 
were adequately connected to Caranchini’s client.105  The court held she: (1) 
pursued a frivolous claim, (2) failed to take reasonable measures to expedite 
litigation, (3) knowingly made a false statement to the tribunal, (4) unlawfully 
obstructed another party’s access to evidence, (5) failed to diligently attempt 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 230. 
 97. Id. at 231. 
 98. In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 914–15 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). 
 99. Id. at 915. 
 100. Id. at 916. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 917–18. 
 104. Id. at 917. 
 105. Id. at 917–18. 
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to comply with discovery requests, and (6) engaged in conduct prejudicial to 
the administration of justice.106 
In the fourth case, Caranchini filed a frivolous motion for sanctions 
against opposing counsel and pursued a frivolous appeal.107  The court again 
found that she: (1) pursued a frivolous claim, (2) failed to take reasonable steps 
to expedite litigation, and (3) engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice.108 
The court did not reference any mitigating factors and strictly followed 
precedent and the Standards in disbarring Caranchini because she “intention-
ally submitted a false document, intentionally made false statements, and in-
tentionally withheld material information.”109  The court explained, “This mis-
conduct is an affront to the fundamental and indispensable principle that a law-
yer must proceed with absolute candor towards the tribunal.  In the absence of 
that candor, the legal system cannot properly function.”110 
In the case In re Carey, the court in 2002 found that Carey and Danis 
“violated two of the most fundamental principles of our [legal] profession, loy-
alty to the client and honesty to the bench.”111  A former client sued Carey and 
Danis for breach of fiduciary duty after both lawyers knowingly failed to pro-
duce forty-two documents requested multiple times in interrogatories.112  The 
two attorneys established the following mitigating factors: no prior disciplinary 
action, several attorneys attested to their reputations for loyalty to the client 
and honesty to the bench, participation in charities and pro bono work, and the 
satisfaction of an $850,000 judgment against them.113  Because of these miti-
gating factors, the court indefinitely suspended, rather than disbarring, Carey 
and Danis.114 
Considering the precedent above, it appears the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri takes the duty of honesty to the tribunal quite seriously.  The court dis-
barred three of the six offending attorneys, while the lightest punishment the 
court doled out was a six-month suspension.115  The court mentioned several 
mitigating factors in deciding not to disbar Mr. Ver Dught, Mr. Carey, and Mr. 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 918. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 919. 
 110. Id. at 919–20. 
 111. In re Carey, 89 S.W.3d 477, 503 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 112. Id. at 489. 
 113. Id. at 503. 
 114. Id. at 504. 
 115. In re Ver Dught, 825 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (attorney sus-
pended for six months); In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Mo. 1994) (en 
banc) (attorney disbarred); In re Storment, 873 S.W.2d 227, 231 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) 
(attorney disbarred); Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d at 919 (attorney disbarred); Carey, 89 
S.W.3d at 504 (both attorneys suspended indefinitely). 
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Danis.116  The case law suggests the court has little patience for attorneys who 
intentionally deceive the tribunal, and absent several mitigating factors, the 
court disbars – as the Standards prescribe – those attorneys who intentionally 
deceive the tribunal.  The presence or absence of mitigating evidence seems to 
be the crux of the court’s punishment in reprimanding lawyers who knowingly 
present false evidence, at least in the cases cited in Krigel. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In re Krigel required the Supreme Court of Missouri to weigh Krigel’s 
extensive past without disciplinary action against his violation of one of a law-
yer’s most serious ethical duties – candor toward the tribunal.  Judge George 
W. Draper’s majority opinion, joined by Judges Stith and Russell, concluded 
that disbarment was inappropriate given Krigel’s extensive past without disci-
plinary action.117  The court held that Krigel violated Rules 4-3.3(a)(3), 4-
4.1(a), 4-4.4(a), and 4-8.4(d) and stayed his suspension, subject to Krigel com-
pleting two years’ probation.118 
Chief Justice Patricia Breckenridge filed an opinion concurring with the 
court’s discipline, but she dissented from the finding that Krigel violated Rule 
4-4.4(a).119  This Note does not discuss Chief Justice Breckenridge’s opinion 
because she concurred in the discipline; instead, it primarily analyzes Krigel’s 
violation of 4-3.3(a)(3) and the court’s decision to spare Krigel’s law license.  
Believing Krigel should have been disbarred, Judge Zel M. Fischer dissented; 
Judges Wilson and Teitelman joined the dissenting opinion.120 
A.  The Majority 
Because the court reviewed the evidence de novo, it began by determining 
what rules Krigel violated.121  The court found that Krigel offered evidence he 
knew to be false, violating Rule 4-3.3(a)(3), when he questioned Birth Mother 
at the adoption hearing.122  Specifically, Krigel knew Birth Father did not con-
sent to adoption and was unaware of the child’s birth, but he helped Birth 
Mother convince the court that Birth Father had simply failed to exercise his 
 
 116. Ver Dught, 825 S.W.2d at 851 (finding in mitigation that Ver Dught contrib-
uted to his profession, community, and church, and that he possessed a “good” reputa-
tion in the community); Carey, 89 S.W.3d at 503 (citing the following mitigating fac-
tors: no prior disciplinary action, several attorneys attested to their reputations for loy-
alty to the client and honesty to the bench, participation in charities and pro bono work, 
and the satisfaction of an $850,000 judgment against them). 
 117. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 302 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 118. See generally id. at 296. 
 119. Id. at 302–03 (Breckenridge, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 120. Id. at 306 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 299 (majority opinion). 
 122. Id. 
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parental rights.123  Birth Mother additionally testified that Birth Father was able 
to continually communicate with her, which Krigel knew was false.124  The 
majority concluded “Krigel’s representation to the trial court via his question-
ing, by permitting false and misleading testimony to be presented, was de-
signed to portray the false impression that Birth Father was not interested in 
the child or in asserting his parental rights.”125 
The court found that Krigel violated Rule 4-4.1(a), which bars a lawyer 
from knowingly making a false statement of material fact to a third person, 
when he told Zimmerman the child would not be adopted without Birth Fa-
ther’s consent.126 
Next, the court held that Krigel used means having no substantial purpose 
other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, violating Rule 4-
4.4(a).127  Krigel actively withheld information from Birth Father and “pursued 
a course of action that disregarded the parental rights of Birth Father and the 
best interests of the child in remaining with a natural parent.”128 
Lastly, the court held that Krigel violated Rule 4-8.4(d) and engaged in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in submitting a Petition to 
Approve, Consent, and Transfer of Custody, declaring Birth Mother knew of 
no one else claiming to have custodial or visitation rights.129  The court found 
that statement untrue and concluded Krigel “thwarted” Birth Father’s oppor-
tunity to assert his parental rights.130 
The court shifted to discipline and noted at the outset that it relies on the 
Standards when imposing sanctions.131  It highlighted four factors the court 
generally considers: (1) duty violated, (2) lawyer’s mental state, (3) potential 
or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and (4) aggravating and 
mitigating factors.132  The court focused on the final factor, listing multiple 
offenses and a failure to grasp the severity of the charges as aggravating fac-
tors.133  It failed to mention Krigel’s extensive legal experience as an aggravat-
ing factor.134  The court noted in mitigation Krigel’s more than thirty years of 
practice without disciplinary action.135 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 299–300. 
 127. Id. at 300. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 300–01. 
 132. Id. at 301.  This Note does not discuss the recommended sanctions for the other 
offenses at issue because the Rule 4-3.3(a) violation is the most serious, and the court 
must issue punishment consistent with the offender’s most serious violation. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
13
Craigmyle: Picking Winners and Losers
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
182 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
The court acknowledged that Krigel’s punishment should be consistent 
with that of his most egregious violation.136  It concluded that his most egre-
gious violation was making a false statement to, and withholding material in-
formation from, the tribunal, for which disbarment is usually the appropriate 
sanction.137  After noting that disbarment is reserved for “clear cases of gross 
misconduct” where the lawyer is unfit to continue practicing law, the court 
distinguished In re Oberhellmann.138  The court found the analogy of Krigel’s 
conduct to Oberhellmann inapposite because Oberhellmann committed mis-
conduct in two separate cases.139  Considering a lesser degree of punishment, 
the court stated that suspension might be appropriate when the lawyer “merely 
knows of the misrepresentation” or “knows that a false statement is being sub-
mitted to a court and takes no remedial action.”140 
The court denied Krigel’s request that no sanction be imposed because 
“Krigel’s conduct in this matter was not passive; he knew material information 
was withheld from the trial court, and he took no remedial action during any of 
the proceedings.”141  The court found disbarment inappropriate because “Kri-
gel has never been disciplined by this [c]ourt and has specialized in this area 
of law for more than thirty years without complaint.”142  Instead, the court sus-
pended Krigel for six months and stayed its execution pending completion of 
two years’ probation.143 
B.  The Dissent 
Judge Zel M. Fischer, joined by Judges Wilson and Teitelman, dis-
sented.144  The dissent opened with a quote of the oath every lawyer licensed 
to practice in Missouri must take: “That I will never seek to mislead the judge 
or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law[.]”145  Because Krigel 
violated the oath, as well as several Missouri Rules, the dissent would disbar, 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 301–02 (quoting In re Ver Dught, 825 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Mo. 1992) (en 
banc)). 
 139. Id. (“In Oberhellmann, the attorney’s misrepresentations were made in two 
separate and unrelated cases.  In one case, the attorney affirmatively instructed his client 
to perjure herself on the witness stand, and in the other case, the attorney forged his 
former legal associate’s signature on a document submitted to the court.  The analogy 
of Krigel’s conduct to Oberhellmann is inapposite.”). 
 140. Id. at 302 (first quoting In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 919 (Mo. 1997) (en 
banc); and then quoting In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Mo. 1994) (en 
banc)). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 306 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
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or at a minimum, suspend Krigel indefinitely, without leave to reapply for six 
months.146 
Unlike the majority, the dissent allowed the circuit court’s judgment re-
moving the child from the adoptive parents and placing it with the Birth Father 
to inform its opinion.147  The dissent quoted the beginning of the circuit court’s 
judgment: “The facts of this case shock the justice system that the people of 
Missouri enjoy.  The [c]ourt finds the actions of officers of this [c]ourt [refer-
ring to Krigel] to be at minimum disturbing to the administration of justice.”148  
The dissent also highlighted the circuit court’s finding that Krigel received 
from the adoptive parents $22,000 for “a minimal role in the litigation.”149 
The dissent relied on precedent in concluding Rule 4-3.3(a) violations 
have typically resulted in disbarment or indefinite suspension.150  When im-
posing sanctions in Oberhellman, the court stated, “Disbarment is appropriate 
when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive a court, makes a false statement or 
submits a false document to a court.”151  The dissent found this controlling and 
attacked the majority for “turn[ing] an ‘about face’ from this precedent in 
merely suspending Krigel, staying the suspension, and permitting Krigel to 
continue to practice on probation.”152 
V.  COMMENT 
This Part compares the majority opinion to the precedent the court cited 
and argues the majority diverged from this precedent.  Next, it offers an alter-
native analysis of how Krigel’s conduct should be examined under the Stand-
ards.  Lastly, this Part argues the majority’s punishment fails to achieve what 
it considers to be the two main purposes of punishment. 
A.  The Majority Diverged from Precedent 
The court, in establishing the legal framework, noted, “Generally, ‘when 
an attorney, with an intent to deceive the court, submits a false document, 
makes a false statement, or withholds material information, disbarment is the 
appropriate sanction.’”153  At first blush, Krigel seems to be a prime candidate 
for disbarment because he knowingly presented false evidence with the intent  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 309–10. 
 148. Id. at 309 (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 149. Id. at 310 (internal quotations omitted). 
 150. Id. (citing In re Carey, 89 S.W.3d 477 (Mo. 2002) (en banc); In re Caranchini, 
956 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); and In re Storment, 873 S.W.2d 227 (Mo. 1997) 
(en banc)). 
 151. In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (emphasis 
added). 
 152. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 311 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 301 (majority opinion) (quoting Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d at 919). 
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to deceive the court.154  Yet the court distinguished Krigel’s conduct from one 
who intends to deceive the court, finding controlling the Standard that governs 
the conduct of an attorney who merely knows of the misrepresentation.155  But 
in doing so, the court failed to distinguish Krigel’s conduct from Oberhellman, 
Storment, and Caranchini, who were all disbarred because of their intention to 
deceive the court.156 
Oberhellmann instructed his client to perjure herself and also offered a 
forged document.157  Although the record is absent of any evidence that Krigel 
instructed Birth Mother to lie under oath, the court found Krigel and Birth 
Mother employed a passive strategy to keep Birth Father in the dark.158  Krigel 
then elicited testimony whereby Birth Mother perjured herself in the hearing to 
terminate her parental rights.159  Krigel and Birth Mother obviously concocted 
a plan to deceive Birth Father, and the court, from the outset.  The majority 
acknowledged this in concluding that Krigel violated Rule 4-3.3(a)(3): “Kri-
gel’s representation to the trial court via his questioning, by permitting false 
and misleading testimony to be presented, was designed to portray the false 
impression that Birth Father was not interested in the child or in asserting his 
parental rights.”160  Therefore, the majority’s conclusion that the Standard gov-
erning conduct where a lawyer merely knows of the misrepresentation contra-
dicts its earlier analysis of Krigel’s conduct. 
In distinguishing Krigel’s conduct from Oberhellmann’s, the majority 
seemed to mischaracterize the dissent’s use of Oberhellman.  The majority ex-
plained, “The dissent believes that Krigel should be disbarred from the practice 
of law, comparing Krigel’s conduct to that of the attorney in In re Oberhell-
mann.”161  The majority reasoned that the comparison between Krigel’s con-
duct and Oberhellmann was “inapposite” because Oberhellmann’s misrepre-
sentations were made in two separate cases.162  But the dissent merely recited 
Oberhellmann to provide the legal background; its real purpose in using Ober-
hellmann was to establish the legal standard.  The dissent’s block quotation of 
the reasoning in Oberhellmann affirmed this.163  Judge Fischer used Oberhell-
mann to stand for the proposition that a lawyer should be disbarred if he, with 
 
 154. See id. at 301–02. 
 155. Id. at 302 (emphasis added) (“Turning to [the] ABA Standards, this [c]ourt 
finds the appropriate recommended range of discipline to be reflected in ABA Standard 
6.12[, which notes when suspension, not disbarment, is appropriate].”). 
 156. See generally id. 
 157. In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 853, 855 (Mo. 1994) (en banc). 
 158. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 297–98. 
 159. Id. at 298 (“In response to a question by Krigel, Birth Mother agreed that Birth 
Father ‘had been consulted at length about the matter.’  Birth Mother also agreed when 
Krigel asked ‘even though you’ve talked to him and his family at some length, he has 
not stepped forward since the birth of the child claiming any rights to the child.’”). 
 160. Id. at 299. 
 161. Id. at 301. 
 162. Id. at 301–02. 
 163. The dissent quoted the following from Oberhellmann: 
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the intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement to the court.  It is irrel-
evant that Krigel’s conduct failed to rise to the level of Oberhellmann’s; the 
dispositive fact is Krigel knowingly offered false evidence and intentionally 
asked Birth Mother questions to elicit that false evidence. 
Next, Storment counseled his client to testify falsely and asked questions 
during direct examination designed to elicit the false testimony.164  The court 
concluded suspension was not appropriate because “Storment’s active role 
transcends failure to remedy.”165  So the court disbarred him.166  In determining 
Krigel’s punishment, the majority highlighted that “Krigel’s conduct in this 
matter was not passive; he knew material information was withheld from the 
trial court, and he took no remedial action during any of the proceedings.”167  
But the court did not go so far as to characterize Krigel’s conduct as active, 
even though he asked questions to elicit false testimony, which is analogous to 
Storment’s conduct that the court considered “active.”168 
Lastly, Caranchini, among other things, intentionally submitted a forged 
document, intentionally made false statements, and intentionally withheld ma-
terial information.169  The court in disbarring Caranchini stated its decision 
“must turn on the precedent that when an attorney, with an intent to deceive 
the court, submits a false document, makes a false statement, or withholds ma-
terial information, disbarment is the appropriate sanction.”170  Although Krigel 
did not submit a false document or make a false oral statement, the majority 
concluded his questioning at the paternity hearing “omitted essential infor-
mation.”171  Further, Krigel signed the Petition to Approve, Consent, and 
Transfer of Custody, which stated Birth Mother was unaware of any other per-
son asserting a custodial claim over the child; of course, Birth Mother knew 
Birth Father asserted custody over the child.172  It is worth pointing out that the 
 
 
In cases of false statements, fraud, or misrepresentation, this [c]ourt issues rep-
rimands only if the lawyer is merely negligent in determining whether state-
ments or documents are false.  Respondent was more than negligent; therefore, 
public reprimand is not appropriate.  Nor is suspension appropriate.  Suspension 
is appropriate only if a lawyer knows that a false statement is being submitted 
to a court and takes no remedial action.  Disbarment is the appropriate sanction 
for respondent.  Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to 
deceive a court, makes a false statement or submits a false document to a court. 
 
Id. at 311 (Fischer, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 856, 
(Mo. 1994) (en banc)). 
 164. In re Storment, 873 S.W.2d 227, 229–30 (Mo. 1994) (en banc). 
 165. Id. at 231. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 302. 
 168. Id. at 298; Storment, 873 S.W.2d at 231. 
 169. In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 919 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 299. 
 172. Id. at 300. 
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disbarment standard does not require an attorney to submit a false document, 
make a false statement, and withhold material information.  The standard is 
disjunctive.  Disbarment is appropriate if an attorney does any one of those 
things with the intent to deceive the court. 
B.  The Majority Improperly Weighed the Standards 
The court highlighted four factors it generally considers when determin-
ing what sanction to impose: (1) “the duty violated;” (2) “the lawyer’s mental 
state;” (3) “the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; 
and” (4) “the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.”173  The majority 
mostly analyzed aggravating and mitigating factors – consistent with the pat-
tern identified in Part III.C – but this Part argues that all four factors favor 
disbarring Krigel. 
First, the court analyzes the duty violated.  The majority acknowledged 
Krigel’s most serious act of misconduct was his lack of candor to the tribu-
nal.174  Duties to the tribunal are among lawyers’ most important ethical obli-
gations, and some scholars believe the duty of candor is even more important 
than lawyers’ duties to their clients.175  The Supreme Court of Missouri has 
characterized the duty of candor to the tribunal as “fundamental and indispen-
sable” and claimed that the legal system could not function properly without 
it.176  The commentary accompanying the Standards reiterates this, instructing 
that those who, with the intent to deceive the court, make a false statement or 
improperly withhold information “violate the most fundamental duty of an of-
ficer of the court.”177  The circuit court believed Krigel’s actions “shock[ed] 
the justice system,” and “at [a] minimum disturb[ed] . . . the administration of 
justice.”178  Because Krigel violated what some consider his most important 
obligation, this factor cuts toward disbarment. 
Second, the court determines the lawyer’s mental state.  Under the Stand-
ards, after an attorney makes false statements or withholds material infor-
mation, the severity of punishment hinges on his mental state.  If the lawyer 
does these things with the intent to deceive the court, then disbarment is appro-
priate.179  But if the attorney merely knows these things are happening and fails 
 
 173. Id. at 301. 
 174. Id. 
 175. John M. Burman, Lawyers’ Duties to Tribunals: Part II – Candor, WYO. 
LAW., Dec. 2011, at 46 (“Having determined that a lawyer’s duties to tribunals have 
priority over all other duties only begins the inquiry.”). 
 176. In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 919–20 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (“This mis-
conduct is an affront to the fundamental and indispensable principle that a lawyer must 
proceed with absolute candor towards the tribunal.  In the absence of that candor, the 
legal system cannot properly function.”). 
 177. MODEL STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 6.11 cmt. (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 1986). 
 178. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 309 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 179. MODEL STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 6.11. 
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to remedy them, then suspension will suffice.180  Krigel clearly intended to de-
ceive the court in eliciting false testimony from Birth Mother and withholding 
material information.  Implicit in the majority’s conclusion that the Standard 
governing suspension controlled was its inference that Krigel merely knew of 
the misrepresentations and did not intend to deceive the court.181  Yet that con-
clusion is inconsistent with the majority’s conclusion that “Krigel’s question-
ing of Birth Mother at that hearing was designed to mislead the trial court as to 
the actual circumstances between Birth Mother and Birth Father.”182  Because 
Krigel intended to deceive the court, this factor cuts toward disbarment. 
Third, the court examines the potential or actual injury caused by the law-
yer’s misconduct.  The majority failed to mention this factor, but the dissent 
articulated the situation as “a fraud on the circuit court that resulted in a father 
not receiving custody of his child in excess of a year, and Krigel receiving 
$22,000 for a minimal role in the litigation.”183  It is easy for lawyers and law 
students to become desensitized to egregious facts as they are commonplace in 
the practice and study of law.  But a father could not see or hold his child for 
more than one year because of Krigel’s intentional, highly calculated, conduct.  
Further, it seems as though the justice system is practically rewarding Krigel 
for intentionally deceiving the court – yes, he is on probation, but he may none-
theless continue to practice law, and he profited from his appalling conduct.  
This amounts to significant harm that is arguably more serious – as it deals 
with parental custody – than the cases cited by the majority.  This factor weighs 
in favor of disbarment. 
Fourth, the court determines any aggravating and mitigating factors. The 
majority devoted significant discussion to this factor.  The court cited in aggra-
vation that Krigel committed multiple offenses and failed to understand the 
severity of the charges.184  In mitigation, the majority noted that Krigel has 
been practicing for more than thirty years with no prior disciplinary history.185  
The crux of the court’s analysis was this lone mitigation factor: “Considering 
Krigel has never been disciplined by this [c]ourt and has specialized in this area 
 
 180. Id. at 6.12. 
 181. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 302 (“A lesser sanction of suspension may be appropri-
ate in cases when ‘the attorney merely knows of the misrepresentation. . . .’  ‘Suspen-
sion is appropriate only if a lawyer knows that a false statement is being submitted to a 
court and takes no remedial action.’  Turning to [the] ABA Standards, this [c]ourt finds 
the appropriate recommended range of discipline to be reflected in ABA Standard 
6.12.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting In re Caranchini, 956 
S.W.2d 910, 919 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); and then quoting In re Oberhellmann, 873 
S.W.2d 851, 856 (Mo. 1994) (en banc))). 
 182. Id. at 299 (emphasis added). 
 183. Id. at 310 (Fischer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omit-
ted). 
 184. Id. at 301 (majority opinion). 
 185. Id. 
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of law for more than thirty years without complaint, disbarment is an inappro-
priate sanction.”186  But the court failed to acknowledge that Krigel’s vast ex-
perience is also an aggravating factor – the Standards clearly list “substantial 
experience in the practice of law” as an aggravating factor.187  The logic behind 
this aggravating factor is that experienced lawyers should know better than to 
engage in this conduct, while inexperienced lawyers might act unethically be-
cause of youth and inexperience.188  The majority cited Krigel’s substantial 
experience in the practice of law three separate times as a mitigating factor,189 
but it failed to cite Krigel’s more than thirty years’ experience specializing in 
adoption law as an aggravating factor.  Every lawyer, even a first-year associ-
ate, should know not to intentionally deceive the tribunal.  But a lawyer with 
more than thirty years’ experience in adoption law should be intimately aware 
of the negative repercussions that follow from deceiving a court in adoption 
proceedings. 
It will always be the case that an experienced lawyer with no prior viola-
tions may be viewed one of two ways: (1) a lawyer who deserves a break be-
cause of his long record of good behavior, or (2) a lawyer who – based on his 
experience – should have known better and should be punished more severely 
because the violation was not the result of inexperience.  This invites judges to 
arbitrarily choose whether a long record with no ethical violations mitigates or 
aggravates the violation.  Not only does this case involve violating a lawyer’s 
most fundamental duty, but this duty was violated by a lawyer who has sub-
stantial experience.  He knew better.  In sum, there is one mitigating factor, 
which also doubles as an aggravating factor, weighed against three aggravating 
factors – this balancing favors disbarment. 
C.  The Majority’s Punishment Does Not Serve What It Considers the 
Two Primary Purposes of Punishment 
The majority considered protecting the public and maintaining the integ-
rity of the profession as the twin purposes of punishing lawyers who violate 
the ethics rules.190  The court noted that it may accomplish these purposes di-
 
 186. Id. at 302. 
 187. MODEL STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1986). 
 188. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 68 (2016) (“Substantial experience is 
deemed to be an aggravating factor in determining a sanction for attorney misconduct, 
while lack of experience as a lawyer is considered to be a mitigating factor; the distinc-
tion is made in recognition of the fact that a youthful and inexperienced attorney may 
have engaged in misconduct as a result of inexperience rather than as a result of delib-
erate calculation.”). 
 189. Krigel, 480 S.W.3d at 297, 301, 302. 
 190. Id. at 301. 
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/10
2017] PICKING WINNERS AND LOSERS 189 
rectly, by removing a lawyer from the practice of law, and indirectly, by order-
ing sanctions that deter others from engaging in similar conduct.191  The ma-
jority’s decision to stay Krigel’s six-month suspension fails to accomplish ei-
ther punishment purpose.  First, the majority does not protect the public be-
cause Krigel – even after eliciting false testimony and withholding material 
information – is still practicing law.  Krigel may continue to practice adoption 
law so long as he does not violate the terms of his two-year probationary pe-
riod.192  It is unlikely that the probationary terms will change the nature of Kri-
gel’s practice.  It should be relatively easy for Krigel to satisfy the terms.  The 
majority listed as an aggravating factor that Krigel failed to appreciate the se-
verity of his conduct, which implies he might engage in this behavior again.  
Under the majority’s decision, Krigel has the opportunity to do so at any time. 
Second, the majority’s punishment does not protect the integrity of the 
profession.  This decision tells lawyers if they have a long history of practicing 
law with no prior ethical violations, they will be treated leniently, even if they 
violate the lawyer’s most fundamental duty.  Instead of deterring other lawyers 
from engaging in such conduct, the majority’s decision implies that it is ac-
ceptable to bend the rules so long as the lawyer is experienced and well be-
haved to date.  There will be repercussions, such as probation, if these rules are 
bent, but these repercussions will not keep experienced lawyers with no disci-
plinary history from practicing law. 
Third, because this decision strays from precedent, it leaves practitioners 
wondering what will happen in a similar case.  Is Krigel an outlier, or is the 
Supreme Court of Missouri moving toward a more lenient treatment of lawyers 
who violate the duty of candor toward the tribunal?  This decision tells experi-
enced lawyers they may intentionally deceive the tribunal and continue to prac-
tice law if it is their first documented misstep.  That message undermines the 
integrity of the legal profession and the public’s trust in lawyers.  Hopefully 
Krigel is an outlier, rather than the turn of the ethical tide in Missouri. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Due to the nature of the profession, lawyers must obey strict ethical obli-
gations.  No obligation is more important than the duty of candor to the tribu-
nal.  After all, how will our legal system function properly if lawyers fail to 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 302.  The terms of Krigel’s probation require him to: (1) submit quarterly 
reports to his probation monitor, (2) comply with the Missouri Rules, (3) attend the 
Solo & Small Firm Conference of The Missouri Bar (which may count toward his fif-
teen-hour CLE requirement), (4) obtain malpractice insurance, (5) notify the CDC of 
any change of employment, (6) report the details of any client trust accounts, (7) pro-
vide audits of the client trust accounts, (8) pay for probation participation, and (9) com-
ply with terms one through eight or face a potential six-month suspension of his law 
license.  See generally Terms and Conditions of Probation at 1–7, In re Krigel, 480 
S.W.3d 294 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
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exercise honesty and trustworthiness before the court?  Krigel violated this fun-
damental ethical duty – yet the Supreme Court of Missouri stayed the execution 
of his six-month suspension.  In doing so, the majority departed from precedent 
and misapplied the Standards.  The decision in this case shows one of two 
things: (1) the Supreme Court of Missouri judges decide disciplinary cases 
based on their subjective beliefs of what is proper, regardless of precedent, or 
(2) Missouri is headed in a more lenient direction when it comes to punishing 
lawyers who violate ethical obligations.  Hopefully the court corrects this mis-
step and replaces subjective manipulation of the Standards with a stricter ad-
herence to its own precedent. 
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